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Abstract
Not only in the classic Arrow-Debreu model, but also in many main-
stream macro models, an implicit assumption is that all agents honour
their obligations, and thus there is no possibility of default. That leads
to well-known problems in providing an essential role for either money
or for financial intermediaries. So, in more realistic models, the in-
troduction of minimal financial institutions, for example default and
banks, becomes a logical necessity. But if default involved no penal-
ties, everyone would do so. Hence there must be default penalties to
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allow for an equilibrium with partial default. What we show here is
that there is an equivalence between a general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets (GEI) and endogeneous default, and a model with
exogenous probabilities of default (PD). The practical, policy impli-
cations are that a key function of regulators (via bankruptcy codes
and default legislation), or the markets (through default premia) are
broadly substitutable. The balance between these alternatives de-
pends, however, on many institutional details, which are not modelled
here, but should be a subject for future research.
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1 Introduction
One of the key features of recent papers aiming to analyze financial fragility
(Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2006) and Tsomocos (2003a, 2003b))
is the modelling of endogenous default. The idea of including the possi-
bility of default in general equilibrium models can be traced back at least
to Shubik and Wilson (1977). Subsequently Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992)
and Dubey, Geanakoplos, Shubik (2005) formally analyzed default in models
with and without uncertainty.1 In the classic Arrow-Debreu model, an im-
plicit assumption is that all agents honour their obligations, and thus there
is no possibility of default. However, when one uses models, such as strategic
market games á la Shapley and Shubik (1977), then the introduction of min-
imal institutions, for example money, credit and default, becomes a logical
necessity. In particular, Shubik and Wilson (1977) allow agents to choose
their repayment rates. Thus equilibrium becomes compatible with partial
or complete abrogation of agents’ contractual obligations. If agents are not
accountable for their repayments, they will rationally choose not to repay
any of their debts. Thus, we are naturally led to introduce default penalties2
1Hart and Moore (1994) have also analyzed endogenous default based on the idea of
the inalienability of labour. Since future labour contracts can not be binding, default may
arise endogenously.
2Default penalties may be either pecuniary or non-pecuniary and they are modelled
by subtracting a linear term from the utility function which is proportional to the level
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that constrain agents’ choices of repayment. In sum, if these default penal-
ties are infinite then the model reduces to the standard Arrow-Debreu model
- plus the added constraint, under uncertainty and incomplete markets, that
none will borrow - whereas if these penalties are zero no equilibrium can be
established, since there will be unbounded credit demand and zero credit
supply. In conclusion, Shubik and Wilson treat default continuously (i.e.
they allow for partial default in equilibrium), thus providing a useful frame-
work to analyze financial fragility as we encounter it in reality (and not only
extreme phenomena such as complete disruption of credit markets as, for
example, in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (GST) incorporate a number of com-
mercial banks in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. Each
bank raises funds in the interbank market and from depositors, and extends
loans to households. Both banks and households may default on their debt
contracts for strategic reasons or due to ill fortune. If they choose not to
honour their contract obligations fully, they incur penalties in proportion to
the amount by which they default. One of the features of the model, and
generally of the models with endogenous default mentioned above, is that
assets are characterized as pools. Diﬀerent sellers of the same asset typically
of debt. See Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) for the general treatment of default in these
classes of models.
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default in diﬀerent events, and in diﬀerent proportions. However, the buyers
of the asset receive a pro rata share of all the sellers’ deliveries. When the
pools are large, a buyer can reasonably assume that both the price of the
asset and the pool delivery rate are unaﬀected by the number of shares he
buys. These features maintain anonymity in the market and price taking
behaviour.
The prospect of banks partially defaulting on deposit contracts (or in the
interbank market) may seem unreasonable if suspension of convertibility is
not a possibility. In other words, a bank’s default on its demand deposits (or
on its loan obligations towards other banks) triggers closure. Thus, a natural
question arises as to whether the Shubik framework of endogenous default is
compatible with the institutional features of the banking sector whereby, if
there is any default on deposits (or interbank transactions), a bank is forced
to shut. A related issue to the previous question is whether the modelling
of endogenous default can serve as an appropriate microfoundation of the
commonly used probabilities of default in applied analysis of credit risk,
corporate default, etc., (see Merton (1974)). Our aim is to assess whether
this class of models can address this issue.
We will argue that there exists an equivalence between a general equi-
librium model with incomplete markets and endogenous default and one
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with exogenous probabilities of default. In particular, we will show that
the Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (DGS) model is equivalent to a model
where assets are defined not only with respect to their returns but also
with respect to their exogenously specified state dependent probabilities of
default.
Put diﬀerently, we will show that the DGS model produces the same
equilibrium allocation as a standard GEI economy where assets are default-
able. The upshot of our analysis is that endogenous default provides mi-
crofoundations to exogenous probabilities of default. Moreover, all these
modelling techniques shed light on the general issue of partial fulfillment
of contractual obligations in modern economies. Indeed, one would argue
that a key function that the regulator (through default legislation), or the
markets (through default premia) serve in our stylized model are broadly
substitutable. Institutional factors, such as transaction costs or legislative
and executive powers, influence which of the approaches are adopted in
practice. However, at this level of simplicity we can not oﬀer an analytical
argument to determine which of the two will be implemented. There will be
much adverse selection, with those expecting a high likelihood of defaulting
trying to borrow. Thus, in the absence of common knowledge, default pre-
mia can not work very eﬃciently, collateral is scarce, and this provides the
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raison d’être for default penalties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
DGS model and show its equivalence with the defaultable asset economy.
Section 3 concludes and oﬀers some potential extensions to our analysis.
2 Endogenous default, probabilities of default and
assets
We first consider the DGS model. It is the canonical general equilibrium
model with incomplete markets where agents are allowed to default on their
contractual obligations on asset sales. For the sake of exposition, we consider
a simplified version in which time extends over two periods and there are
only two possible states of nature in the second period. Thus, we allow only
one asset to be traded in the first period to maintain market incompleteness.
There also exists one commodity per period.3 Without loss of generality, the
asset is in zero net supply. Agents trade in the commodity market and also
in the asset market in the first period. In the second period, the asset pays
oﬀ and commodity trading occurs. In addition, agents are allowed to default
in the asset market but they are penalized proportionally to the amount of
3The extension to a multicommodity GEI requires a more thorough analysis of diﬀerent
forms of default and of real versus nominal penalties.
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their debt.4
Formally, the notation that will be used henceforth is as follows:
t ∈ T = {0, 1} = time periods,
s ∈ S = {1, 2} = set of states at t = 1,
S∗ = {0} ∪ S = set of all states,
h ∈ H = {1, 2, ...H} = set of economic agents (households),
l ∈ L = {1} = set of commodities,
R+ ×RS+ = commodity space,
eh ∈ R+ ×RS+ = endowments of households,
uh : R+ ×RS+ → R = utility function of agent h ∈ H,
xhs = consumption of the commodity in state s by agent h ∈ H,
A ∈ RS+ = promise per unit of the asset of the commodity in each state
s ∈ S,
Qh ∈ RS+ = quantity restriction on sale of the asset for agent h,
λhs ∈ R¯+ = R+ ∪ {∞} = real default penalty on agent h for the asset in
state s.
The endogenous variables to be determined in equilibrium are the fol-
lowing:
p ∈ RS∗+ = commodity price vector,
4This model does not have a monetary sector but it can be easily incorporated along
the lines of Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) and Tsomocos (2003a, 2003b).
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q ∈ R+ = asset price,
K ∈ [0, 1]S = expected delivery rate on the asset,
xh ∈ RS∗+ = consumption of the commodity by agent h,
θh ∈ R+ = asset purchase of h,
ϕh ∈ R+ = asset sale of h,
Dh ∈ RS+ = delivery by agent h on the asset.
The quantity constraints on asset sales are finite and capture the idea
that in any realistic model there exist some limits to credit. The parameters
λhs represent the marginal disutility of defaulting for each “real” dollar on
assets in state s. Therefore, the payoﬀ to households will be ∀s ∈ S∗:
Πhs
³
xhs ,D
h
s , ps
´
= uhs
³
xhs
´
−
λsmax
£
0,
¡
ϕpsAs − psDhs
¢¤
psvs
,
where vs is the base basket of goods which serves as a price deflator with
respect to which the default penalty is measured.5
The standard assumptions hold:
(A1) ∀s ∈ S∗,
P
h∈H e
h
s > 0 (i.e. the commodity is present in all states
of the world).
(A2) ∀s ∈ S∗ and h ∈ H, ehs > 0 for some s ∈ S∗ (i.e. no household has
5 In our case L = 1 so υs can be set equal to 1, ∀s ∈ S∗. However, whenever L > 1 the
specification of υs becomes crucial.
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the null endowment of the commodity in any state of the world).
(A3) Let A be the maximum amount of the commodity s that exists
and let 1 denote the unit vector in RS. Then ∃Q > 0 3 uh (0, ..., Q, ...0) >
uh (A1) for Q in an ordinary component (i.e. strict monotonicity in every
component). Also, continuity and concavity are assumed.
The economy is defined as a vector
E =
n³
uh, eh
´
h∈H
;A,
³
(λs)s∈S , Q
h
´
h∈H
o
.
The equilibrium of the economy is characterised by the vector
¡
xh, θh,ϕh,Dh, p, q,K
¢
,
where
¡
xh, θh,ϕh,Dh
¢
are arg max of the following problem:
max
xh,θh,ϕh,Dh
uh
³
xh0
´
+
X
s
πs
Ã
uh
³
xhs
´
− λ
h
s max [0, (ϕpsAs − psDs)]
psvs
!
(P1)
s.t. p0
³
xh0 − eh0
´
+ q
³
θh − ϕh
´
≤ 0 (1)
and ∀s ∈ S,
ps
³
xhs − ehs
´
+ psDs ≤ θKspsAs (2)
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The market clearing conditions are the following:
X
h∈H
³
xh − eh
´
= 0 (3)
X
h∈H
³
θh − ϕh
´
= 0 (4)
Ks =



P
h∈H psD
h
sP
h ϕpsA
h
s
, if
P
h ϕpsA
h
s > 0
arbitrary, if
P
h ϕpsA
h
s = 0
(5)
So far we have defined an asset as a vector of payoﬀs in the various states
of nature. We now extend the definition of an asset by associating each state
contingent payoﬀ with an exogenously specified repayment rate. Note that
if this repayment value is equal to 100% in certain states and 0% in others,
then we can calculate the probability of default of each asset.6 Thus, assets
are now defined as pairs (A,R), where A = (A1, ..., As, ..., AS) is the vector
of promises in the diﬀerent states as before and R = (R1, ..., Rs, ..., RS) is the
vector of exogenous repayments. We can now define a single asset economy
6If we assume complete markets, we can calculate unique risk-neutral probabilities
and thus unique probabilities of default. However, this is not true when markets are
incomplete. In such a case, we may use the subjective probabilities over the states of
nature of the issuer of an asset to obtain default probabilities. Of course, this implies that
diﬀerent issuers will have diﬀerent probabilities of default.
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E˜, where there is no endogenous default as follows:
E˜ =
n³
uh, eh
´
h∈H
; (A,R)s∈S ,
³
Qh
´
h∈H
o
.
The agents’ maximisation problem can be written as follows:
max
x,θ,ϕ
u (x˜0) +
X
s
πsu (x˜s) (P2)
s.t. : p˜0 (x˜0 − e˜0) + q˜
³
θ˜ − ϕ˜
´
≤ 0, (6)
and ∀s ∈ S,
p˜s (x˜s − e˜s) + p˜sRsAsϕ˜ ≤ p˜sθ˜RsAs, (7)
where K˜s =
P
h psRsP
h ϕ˜psAs
.
The equilibrium is as before except that (P1) is replaced by (P2) and
(5) no longer applies.
We are now ready to state our result, namely, that the two economies E
and E˜ are equivalent for the appropriate selection of λhs and Rs, ∀s ∈ S.
Proposition 1. (i) If
©
xh, θh,ϕh,Dh, p, q,K
ª
constitute an equilibrium
for E, then there exist Rs, ∀s ∈ S, such that
©
xh, θh,ϕh, p, q
ª
constitute an
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equilibrium for E˜. Conversely, (ii) if
n
x˜h, θ˜
h
, ϕ˜h, p˜, q˜
o
constitute an equi-
librium for E˜, then there exist λhs ,D
h
s ,Ks, ∀s ∈ S, and h ∈ H, such thatn
x˜h, θ˜
h
, ϕ˜h,Dh, p˜, q˜,K
o
constitute an equilibrium for E.
Proof. In the case where there is no default, i.e. Dhs = ϕ
hAs, ∀s ∈ S,
h ∈ H, set Ks = Rs = 1, ∀s ∈ S. Then the two problems (P1) and (P2) are
identical and therefore produce the same optimal choices for the optimisation
problem and markets clear at the same prices.
If the previous case does not obtain, then the first order conditions of E
are:
∂uh
¡
xh0
¢
∂xh0
− y0p0 = 0 (8)
πs
∂uh
¡
xhs
¢
∂xhs
− ysps = 0 ∀s ∈ S, (9)
− y0q + y1p1K1A1 + y2p2K2A2 = 0 (10)
− π1λ1A1 − (1− π1)λ2A2 + y0q = 0 (11)
πsλs − ysps = 0 ∀s ∈ S, (12)
y0
h
p0
³
xh0 − eh0
´
+ q
³
θh − ϕh
´i
= 0 (13)
ys
h
ps
³
xhs − ehs
´
+ psD
h
s − θhpsKsAs
i
= 0 ∀s ∈ S, (14)
where ys ∈ S∗ are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget
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constraints.
Furthermore, the first order conditions of E˜ are:
∂uh
¡
x˜h0
¢
∂x˜h0
− y˜0p˜0 = 0 (15)
πs
∂uh
¡
x˜hs
¢
∂x˜hs
− y˜sp˜s = 0 ∀s ∈ S, (16)
− y˜0q˜ + y˜1p˜1R1A1 + y˜2p˜2R2A2 = 0 (17)
y˜0q˜ − y˜1p˜1R1A1 − y˜2p˜2R2A2 = 0 (18)
y˜0
h
p˜0 (x˜0 − e˜0) + q˜
³
θ˜ − ϕ˜
´i
= 0 (19)
y˜s
h
p˜sθ˜
h
RsAs − p˜s (x˜s − e˜s)− p˜sϕ˜hRsAs
i
= 0 ∀s ∈ S, (20)
If we set ysps = y˜sp˜s, ∀s ∈ S∗, then (15) and (16) produce the same
consumption plan as (8) and (9). If we set Rs = Ks, ∀s ∈ S, then (10)
and (17) are also identical. Note that (17) and (18) are identical as well.
It remains to show that the budget constraints (19)-(20) are satisfied with
the equilibrium values of E. (13) and (19) are identical. Finally, given that
Dhs = RsAsϕ˜
h, (20) is also satisfied.
(ii) Let Ks = Rs, and Dhs = RsAsϕ˜
h, ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H. By plugging (12)
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into (10) we obtain:
−yh0 q + π1λh1K1A1 + (1− π1)λh2K2A2 = 0.
Given that Ks = Rs, ∀s ∈ S, and the optimal values y˜h0 , q˜, we have:
−y˜h0 q˜ + π1λh1K1A1 + (1− π1)λh2K2A2 = 0.
Thus, we can find λhs , ∀s ∈ S, that solve the previous equations. The rest of
the proof is as in part (i).
Proposition 1 shows that an economy with endogenous default produces
the same allocation and prices as long as the exogenous probabilities of
default are set equal to the expected recovery rates of the economy with
endogenous default. Conversely, an economy with exogenous probabilities
of default can produce the same equilibrium allocations and prices, provided
that we select the correct bankruptcy penalties. Then, the economy with
endogenous default will produce deliveries and recovery rates equal to the
exogenous probabilities of default that support the equilibrium allocation
and prices of the economy with exogenous probabilities of default.
The upshot of our argument is that modelling endogenous default pro-
15
vides microfoundation to the models that treat default using exogenous de-
fault probabilities
3 Concluding remarks and extensions
One caveat that one should bear in mind in justifying our approach is that
we live in a world where banking systems are usually concentrated. With a
large number of agents, for example in a competitive equilibrium, conditions
where everyone defaults on, say, 5% of their liabilities are equivalent to those
where 5% of agents default on all their debts. This, however, is not the case
when there are only a few agents in a concentrated field. If there are, say,
only two agents in the field, and their failures are independent of each other,
then in 0.25% of all cases there will be 100% default, in 9.5% of cases 50%
default, and in 90.25% of cases no default, which is clearly vastly diﬀerent
from a 5% default rate amongst a large number of agents.
In most countries banking is a concentrated service industry. Moreover,
reputational eﬀects and cross-default clauses, amongst other things, mean
that banks cannot default partially and remain open. If they cannot meet
their payment obligations, (except under force majeure as in 9/11), they
have to close their doors. Except when such closed banks are tiny, such
closure does not however, in almost all cases, then turn into permanent liq-
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uidation. Eﬀectively almost all banks are restructured, often via a ‘bridge
bank’ arrangement, and shortly re-open, with the extent of short-fall of as-
sets distributed amongst the various creditors, (the ‘haircut’ in the American
phrase), the shareholders and taxpayers depending on the deposit insurance
arrangements, bank bankruptcy laws and political pressures. In this latter
sense, even though the banking system is concentrated, and banks have to
close when they cannot meet due payments, it is perfectly valid to assess
strategies as bringing about possible conditions in which a bank defaults by,
say, 5% to all depositors, because that would be the eﬀective loss of funds,
or haircut, in the event of a bad state of the world.
Two possible main extensions of this paper focus on dealing with the
coexistence of the institutional arrangements we examined and their rela-
tionship with collateral requirements as well as infinite horizon. First, the
coexistence of alternative institutional arrangements should be established
within the context of a single model. Also, we would like to investigate
this equivalence in an infinite horizon model, where the possibility of Ponzi
games arises (see Araújo et al, 2002).
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